Assistant Solicitor (Accident, 2-3 Years PQE) Thompsons Solicitors
Thompsons Solicitors & Solicitor Advocates is a distinct law office dealing with personal injury and employment law cases. We only ever act for injured people and not for employers or big businesses.
A knowledgeable Personal Injury Solicitor is wanted for an outstanding chance based in our Glasgow office within our union department. The work is extremely varied and consists of all kinds of personal and bodily injury cases including EL/PL for pursuers.
You ll deal with a caseload which will include the investigation and lawsuits of complex and mid-value cases. Experience of Court of Session and Sheriff Court treatments is necessary.
The effective candidate will be an appropriately certified solicitor with substantial understanding and experience in injury and be knowledgeabled in handling a prosecuted case load.
In return, we at Thompsons can offer you:-.
A promoting environment to work in
A competitive salary
Accident and fatal accident quick – March 2016
Invite to the March 2015 edition of the Personal injury and fatal accident brief.
Vicarious Liability How broad can it extend?
The English Supreme Court has actually recently bied far two vital judgments which may well expand the law on vicarious liability in Hong Kong: Cox v Ministry of Justice and Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc
Mohamud follows the landmark Hong Kong case of Ming An v Ritz Carlton which held that an employer would be vicariously accountable for unauthorised wrongful acts of its employee so long as such act was carefully linked to his work. Cox however, may be more far reaching as the Judgment suggests that offenders aside from the company might likewise be vicariously liable.
2 requirements are required in order for vicarious liability to be imposed. There must be a relationship between the accused and the perpetrator, and second of all, a connection between that relationship and the wrongdoer’s act or default, such as to make it simply that the defendant need to be held lawfully accountable to the complaintant for the effects of the crook’s conduct. If you want to find out more about this topic don’t hesitate to contact click here for more info
Relationship in between the wrongdoer and the accused
Cox concerned whether the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), as being responsible for the jail service, might be held vicariously liable for the acts of a negligent prisoner who hurt the Claimant while the detainee was performing responsibilities in the jail’s catering department.
The MOJ said that there was no employment relationship, the prisoners had to work by law which was for rehab functions, their work did not further the interests of the prison services, and to hold them vicariously liable would be a major advancement of the typical law, which should only be established carefully.
The Supreme Court disagreed and referred to the five features identified in the 2012 Supreme Court Judgment of Various Claimants v. Catholic Child Welfare Society as to why vicarious liability should be troubled companies, namely:
the employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the staff member and can be expected to have actually guaranteed against that liability;
the tort (wrongful act) will have been committed as an outcome of activity being taken by the worker on behalf of the company;
the employee s activity is most likely to be part of the business activity of the company;
the employer, by using the worker to continue the activity will have developed the risk of the tort dedicated by the employee; and
the worker will, to a greater or lesser degree, have actually been under the control of the employer.
Although these aspects described an employer, they could also be applied to relationships which were “similar to that in between a company and a worker.” Not all of the aspects are equally significant (with aspects (i) and (v) having less weight) and they do not all have to exist.
In the context of this case, factors (ii), (iii) and (iv) were all pleased because the prisoner was carrying out an act designated to him which was an integral part of the activities which furthered the jail s objectives (specifically the provision of meals for prisoners). He was placed in a position where there was a danger that he may dedicate a range of irresponsible acts within the field of activities appointed to him (a danger that was acknowledged by the prison, as they provided him health and safety training before enabling him to commence work) and he worked under the instructions of prison staff (including the Claimant). Accordingly, the MOJ was vicariously accountable to the Claimant for the detainee s negligent act.
In Mohamud, the Claimant was a visitor to a gas station and the wrongdoer was a staff member of the petrol station (the Attendant) operated by the defendant supermarket, who was charged with seeing that the gas pumps and stand were kept in good running order and to serve customers. The Claimant asked the Attendant to see if it was possible to print some files being brought by the Claimant on a USB stick, after which the Attendant responded by using foul, racist and threatening language. The Attendant followed the Claimant back to his vehicle, threatened the Claimant never ever to go back to the petroleum station again, struck the Claimant on the left temple after being asked by the Claimant to obtain from [his] car and beat the Claimant severely after the Claimant got out of his car. The Attendant s manager attempted to stop the Attendant but he did not listen.
At first instance, the trial judge held the grocery store was not vicariously liable for the Attendant s unprovoked assault. There was not an adequately close connection between exactly what he was employed to do and his wrongful conduct and the Attendant was acting in contravention of directions provided to him by his supervisor. The Court of Appeal upheld the Judge’s decision that the claim failed the ‘close connection’ test.
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions below and held that the supermarket was vicariously responsible because
There was a seamless episode or unbroken chain of events streaming from the Claimant s request;
The Attendant purchased the Claimant to keep away from his company s properties which was strengthened by violence and in offering such order, the Attendant was claiming to act about his employer s business;
It was a gross abuse of his position, the acts were done in connection with the business in which he was used to serve customers and his employers entrusted him with that position so that the acts need to be taken to have been between the company and the Claimant; and
Intention of the Attendant was irrelevant.
Implications for Hong Kong
Although Muhamud does seem far-reaching, it is consistent with the recent Hong Kong Court of Appeal Judgement in Yeung Mei Hoi v Tam Cheuk Shing & Kai Shing Management Services Limited, involving a fight between two staff members. In Yeung Mei Hoi, the Court stressed that the assault was so carefully connected with the employment that it would be fair and just to hold the company vicariously liable.
Cox could also have implications for companies or organizations who engage others to perform work (principals). Primary specialists of building websites, property supervisors, logistics business and other comparable type companies frequently engage 3rd celebrations to provide labour or services at their website or facilities. If the duties the negligent person was performing was an integral part of the principal’s company, the principal will not get away vicarious liability even though that individual was utilized by a 3rd party company.
As the courts widen the scope of vicarious liability, insurance providers exposure to such risks will enhance and they will have to ensure that premiums sufficiently show such exposure.
Fourth Circuit Figures out That “Condition” Is Not “Personal Injury;” North Carolina Statute of Repose Is No Bar To Suit
In 2014, we covered the United States Supreme Court s decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger et al., 134 S. Ct. 2175 (June 9, 2014). In Waldburger, the Court overturned a choice by the Fourth Circuit, and held that while CERCLA preempts state statutes of limitations in toxic tort personal injury and property damage actions, it does not preempt state statutes of repose, like the North Carolina statute of repose at concern, from disallowing comparable actions. Recently, in Stahle v. CTS Corp., No. 15-1001 (March 2, 2016), the Fourth Circuit attended to a lot more standard question, whether the statute of repose at issue in Waldburger is even applicable in such cases.
In Stahle, the plaintiff claimed that he had established leukemia as a result of direct exposure to hazardous substances released into a stream nearby his childhood home. If the ten year statute of repose was applicable, the complainant s claim would be barred without question as the complainant s last possible direct exposure happened in 1968, the year his family moved away from this home. Permitting the action to go forward, the Fourth Circuit held that an illness like the leukemia from which the plaintiff suffers, is not personal injury under the statute and therefore the ten year statute of repose does not use.
The Fourth Circuit s choice in Stahle reverses the high court choice of the Western District of North Carolina and is contrary to a 2014 decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Bryant v. United States, No. 12-15424 (October 14, 2014). Like Stahle, Bryant included accusations of the advancement of latent condition that triggered examination of the meaning of the term personal injury in the same North Carolina statute. Importantly, as noted by both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit courts, North Carolina is the only state without a statutory procedure permitting a federal court to license a question of state law to the state s highest court.
Waldburger, Stahle, and Bryant all involved the interpretation of North Carolina General Statute 1-52(16), which currently checks out:
Unless otherwise supplied by law, for personal injury or physical damage to plaintiff’s property, the cause of action, other than in reasons for actions referred to in G.S. 1-15(c), will not accumulate until bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage to his property emerges or ought reasonably to have emerged to the claimant, whichever event first happens. Except as offered in G.S. 130A-26.3, no cause of action will accumulate more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the offender giving rise to the cause of action.
There is some question regarding the retroactivity of this provision, however (see usually Bryant at 13-15), and this brand-new exception was not dealt with by the Fourth Circuit inStahle. The problem over which the Western District of North Carolina, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit disagree is whether this statutory area applies to claims involving unrealized disease, or only to claims involving unrealized physical injury. The conflict can be distilled down to the definition, or ambiguity, of the term personal injury in the first line of the area.
In holding that the statute does apply to disease, the Eleventh Circuit found that the statute was unambiguous in its application, as on its face, the text of the statute contains no exception for latent illness, and no other North Carolina statute excepts unrealized conditions from the statute of repose. Bryant at 5.
1986), in which it mentioned its understanding that the North Carolina Supreme Court does not consider illness to be included within a statute of repose directed at personal injury claims unless the Legislature expressly broadens the language to include it. The court in Hyer was charged with translating a different North Carolina statute and it relied on a 1985 North Carolina Supreme Court decision that attended to the term bodily injury, not the term personal injury that appears in the statute at issue today. Second, Judge Thacker questioned North Carolina courts approval of the Fourth Circuit s logic in Hyer, keeping in mind that since itwas chosen in 1986, no North Carolina state court has actually relied on itin any published opinion.
This split in between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits is especially unique, as it is based purely on contrasting interpretations of the very same state law, and neither court was able to petition a North Carolina court to fix the problem. Thus, for the time being, the Fourth Circuit s ruling will function as an essential, plaintiff-friendly interpretation of North Carolina state law while the choice from the Eleventh Circuit will sustain accuseds arguments that the statute of repose bars such claims. Till the North Carolina Supreme Court or the North Carolina legislature adequately clarifies it, concerns related to North Carolina s statute of repose are most likely to remain to divide some courts.